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New Ways in 
History, 
or, 
Talking About 
My Generation 
HISTOREIN 
The events surrounding the historian 
and in which he takes part will underlie 
his presentation like a text written in 
invisible ink. 
Walter Benjamin 1 
Prologue: Setting Up the Subject 
In the late 1990s I became increasingly 
interested in historical narrative and its 
connection to changes in the writing of history 
since the 1960s. I had not, at first, thought 
about this as an autobiographical issue until it 
became clear to me that questions about 
historical narratives could not be separated 
from issues about their authors. Besides my 
first foray into writings on history, an 
examination of a special edition of the Times 
Literary Supplement (TLS) of 7 April 1966 
entitled "New Ways in History,"2 I was 
prompted as much by nostalgia as by 
scholarship. I remembered the issue as an 
important moment in my education - I was 
nineteen, newly arrived at Cambridge University 
from Liverpool, and studying history - a text 
that in a few pages encapsulated what was 
wrong with the writing of history in Britain and 
sketched out a hopeful future for the aspiring 
scholar. But, as I scanned the articles more 
than thirty years later, I was surprised, almost 
shocked, by my selective memory of their 
contents. I could recall their attack on traditional 
history - I had a clear memory of what they 
were against - but I had largely suppressed 
their blueprint for the future, replacing it with 
one that was more acceptable, more in 
accordance with a narrative I wanted to retell 
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both about myself and history before 1968. Rereading "New Ways in History" opened up a box 
filled to overflowing with detailed and vivid memories of the 1960s and of my experiences as a 
student and aspiring historian. Why then had I radically misremembered what was, by my own 
admission, a part of something that was very important to me? 
The answer, I think, is that what I read - and had chosen not to recall - was embarrassing to me. 
As we shall see, what the most influential and important essay in "New Ways in History" advo-
cated was a technocratic, objective, scientized history. It placed enormous weight on the power 
of social science to liberate historians from tradition, to contribute to an agenda of modernity 
whose end was a more rational 
egalitarian social order. This 
history was universalist in 
many senses - as a science, 
as having a universal object of 
inquiry - man or society - in 
making claims to universal 
objectivity, and in the priority it 
accorded to quantities not 
qualities. However, contained 
within this history were two 
powerful desires, some might 
say longings - a desire for 
escape and liberation, to end 
confinement, shake off the 
mind-forg'd manacles of tradi-
tion, write the world anew; and 
a desire for (virtually total) 
control expressed in the scien-
tific language of both com-
pleteness and precision. 
Looked at like this, the cutting 
edge of the '60s appears 
laughably old fashioned and 
unsophisticated. Nowadays, 
historians who think them-
selves in the vanguard of historical inquiry worry far more about subjectivity than objectivity, tend 
to see claims to scientific history as epistemologically naive, speak of histories not history, view 
knowledge as embedded or positional rather than universal and, as this series of articles attests, 
demand a high level of self-reflection or reflexivity on the part of the history producer. 
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Of course my embarrassment in reading the views of "New Ways in History" stems not from their 
content but the realization (which I still resist) that they were once my own. I don't, however, want 
to make this into a story about the victory of history over memory, but rather use the engagement 
of history and memory to open up a discussion about the views that I had suppressed. For the 
more I reflected on them the more conscious I became of how widely disseminated and how 
ardently they had been embraced before they were, in turn, vilified, and buried from sight. 
Moreover, the views expressed in "New Ways in History" were by no means confined to the dis­
cussion of an academic discipline. On the contrary, they flourished both in the pop culture and 
leftist politics of the 1960s, albeit in somewhat different forms. 
If the historian's mantra is "always historicize," then we need to understand both the particular 
appeal and purchase of social scientific history in Britain in the 1960s. My story has three regis­
ters, the personal, the cultural and the political. In all three I want to examine the '60s preoccu­
pation with technocratic science, the transformation of the universal historical subject (as well as 
of the subject of history), and with modernity. And I want to suggest that it might be fruitful to 
inquire why it was that this period and place might be characterized as one inordinately preoc­
cupied with both liberation and control, with the contradictory impulses of transcending authori­
ty and discipline and of wielding an almost unstoppable power. 
The version of the '60s I have been alluding to probably seems familiar and strange - familiar 
about liberation, strange about power. This is, I think, because my story is one that is not con­
cerned (or, at least only tangentiale) with 1968, a year whose effect on scholarship about the 
'60s has been much like that of 1789 on the eighteenth century. '68 and its immediate aftermath 
saw a radical transformation in the world I seek to describe - one that replaced the universal aspi­
rations of pop and counter culture, and of scientific socialism with the particularist claims of sub­
cultures, identity politics and the new social movements, a shift that was reflected as much in 
the writing of history as in leftist politics. 
In Britain the failure of Labour governments to deliver the promises proffered by social scientific 
planning and their refusal to condemn the United States' conduct in the Vietnam war, together 
with a growing recognition that the universalist claims to liberation and power were in fact large­
ly confined to heterosexual white males, largely discredited the pre-'68 political vision. Rather 
than seeing this period as leading to the events of 1968, then, I want to stress '68 as a caesura, 
the moment, rather like 1789, when the history of the previous decades was to be rewritten. 
Though I am not a Freudian, I think there is some justification for seeing the phenomenon I 
describe as in some sense oedipal. Certainly in my own case it can be seen that way. I had been 
brought up with two notions of history: my father's, which was conservative, sentimental, privi­
leged, patriotic and imperial, and my uncle's, which was socialist, democratic, didactic and 
radical. My father, a surgeon who wore a suit and a homburg hat and for a while drove a Bentley, 
was a pillar of bourgeois probity, who believed in family and duty, and saw history and the 
museums and art galleries we visited as repositories of tasteful privilege, the remnants of a 
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better, because less egalitarian, less turbulent age when Britain's place as "top nation" secured 
civilization. My uncle, a journalist and writer, and sometime Communist Party candidate, wrote 
books on children's liberation (in the 1950s!), the children's column for Tribune - where he 
explained the importance of such figures as the Tolpuddle Martyrs - and a history of the myths 
used in sex education. He was a bon viveur with long hair, a fine taste in wines, raffish clothing 
and a succession of debts, mistresses and wives. Each of them, I suppose, personified different 
versions of the good life: my father as the dutiful Victorian, my uncle (though older) the freedom-
loving leftist of the 1930s. 
Before my adolescence I was a proto-Victorian: I wore stiff collars, and argued in the school 
debating society that central heating sapped moral fibre and that nuclear arms were necessary if 
Britain were to remain a great power. I was a model cadet in the school's pseudo-military force, 
and could take apart and reassemble a Bren Gun in fifteen seconds. But in the early 1960s I left 
my father for my uncle. I underwent a conversion to Marxism, existentialism, and (I apologize for 
the bathos) sociology. This was an auto-didactic enterprise - the result of browsing library 
shelves, reading the left-wing press and watching late-night television. I often exchanged ideas 
and books with a school friend, now an architect and still, I believe, a Marxist, and we pieced 
together a world view, creating a bricolage whose fragmentary, not to say contradictory, form was 
concealed - at least from me - by its powerful critique of the smug bourgeois world I inhabited. 
The Marx I read (paradoxically borrowed from a library funded by robber baron and partner of 
Andrew Mellon, Andrew Carnegie) was not Capital (which I certainly wouldn't have understood) 
but The Communist Manifesto, The Eighteenth Brumaire, and the newspaper articles he wrote on 
the revolutionary events of 1848. Here was not only a whole new political understanding but also 
a new way of writing history. I was only briefly a Marxist in politics - I was an admirer not a 
believer, not an adherent of revolutionary politics, and have never been attracted to the senten-
tiousness and high-mindedness found in many political groups, whether on the Left or Right. And 
I was also soon to discover that Marxist history and social and economic history were not one 
and the same. 
In 1962 I read Colin Wilson's potboiler on existentialism, The Outsider, and experienced some-
thing close to a religious conversion.3 Over the next five years I read nearly all the authors Wilson 
discussed - Kierkegaard, Camus, Barbusse, Dostoevsky, Sartre, Nietzsche. I cringe now re-read-
ing Wilson's book and don't think I really understood most of what I read in its aftermath, but I 
did find existentialism's emphasis on free agency and responsibility, the Nietzschean critique of 
mindless conformity, the rejection of conventional Christianity, and the emphasis on confronting 
the absurdity of life the perfect basis for a critique of my bourgeois provincial life. 
If Marx provided a politics, and existentialism a blueprint for everyday life, then sociology was the 
means of social transformation, the weapon with which to slay the Victorians. The rational inves-
tigation and analysis of society, cutting through the layers of prejudice and tradition, would 
liberate us from their amateurism and from the class-bound institutions that had sustained their 
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authority. In the pages of such journals as New Society, first published in 1962, could be found -
or so I thought - the plans for a new society, the means to create a just and free way of life, to 
achieve modernity. 
To achieve this it was necessary to destroy the old values, to remove the Victorian father. It may 
seem as if I overemphasize Victorianism, but I was surrounded by it.4 I lived in a decayed 
Victorian city, I went to a school founded by (among others) the Gladstone family, an establish-
ment whose ethics were those of Matthew Arnold - a muscular Christianity exemplified in the 
headmaster's comment that "getting closer to God is heeling the ball cleanly in the rugby scrum" 
- and whose official history was entitled "Liverpool Gentlemen." The environment was a sani-
tized mixture of prudery and duty. I had hoped to escape this when I went to university but even 
there I was to find a sort of Victorianism in the ascendant.5 
Victorian History 
When I went to Cambridge to study "read" history in 1965 
I was in fact following a curriculum that was not very 
different from the syllabus nearly all historians at Oxbridge 
had studied over the previous hundred years. English aca-
demic history was a Victorian invention - the Oxford 
School of Modern History (modern meaning since the fall 
of Rome) was established in 1871, the Cambridge History 
Tripos in 1873. These two courses were part of the insti-
tutionalization of Rankean history in England. They 
followed the establishment of the Public Records Office 
(1866), the foundation of the Royal Historical Society 
(1868), and the publication of the first Historical 
Manuscripts Commission report on privately held manu-
scripts (1870).6 John Brewer in 1967 
This Victorian history had a particular content and purpose. Like its model in Germany it sought 
to apply the rules of evidence to historical documents to reveal the true story that actually 
happened. Central to its purpose was Quellenforschung - the distinction between potentially 
misleading secondary materials and primary sources - original documents - whose critical eval-
uation was the touchstone of historical truth. What counted as an historical document - what 
ended up in the Public Records Office and in the pages of the reports of the Historical 
Manuscripts Commission - was material that cast light on the political history and public life of 
the English nation. What counted as history was primarily political. J. R. Seeley, a key figure in 
the development of the Cambridge Tripos whose memory is perpetuated in the undergraduate 
history library that bears his name, wrote, "History is not concerned with individuals except in 
their capacity as members of a state. That a man in England makes a scientific discovery or 
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paints a picture is not in itself an event in the history of England. Individuals are important in 
history in proportion not to their intrinsic merit, but to their relation to the state."7 The 
hegemonic status of this claim never became clearer than when it finally came under attack. 
As G. R. Elton put it in 1968, "All forms of history that have existed, exist now, or may yet come 
to exist belong to the world which the political historian inhabits."8 
This emphasis on politics and the state was in line with the object of teaching history in the uni-
versities that was to shape the sensibility and vision of a (male) ruling elite. (The first essay I 
wrote at Cambridge, quite typically, was about the so-called "Tudor Revolution in government.") 
Seeley made it crystal clear, "Our university is, and must be, a great seminary of politicians."9 
Nevertheless, history was not seen as directly instrumental - for its lessons; on the contrary, it 
was said to be studied "for its own sake." The historian J. R. Green put it this way: History "was 
looked upon as no special or definitive study, but as part of that general mass of things, which 
every gentleman should know."10 The practice of history (a term and title that G. R. Elton was 
later to take up in his apologia for this sort of history) - empirical, pragmatic, committed to par-
liamentary institutions and their history - would shape the moral vision and codes of conduct of 
magistrates and civil servants, both at home and in the empire. As Herbert Butterfield put it, 
"I happen to think that history is a school of wisdom and statesmanship."11 
It is something of an exaggeration to say that we only studied political and constitutional history. 
(I had chosen Cambridge over Oxford because the Cambridge Tripos was less antediluvian than 
the Oxford School.) Economic history was another German import from the turn of the century; 
there was a strong Cambridge-tradition of studying non-European cultures, albeit under the impe-
rial banner of "the Expansion of Europe"; and, because the history course had emerged from a 
Tripos in moral sciences, we also studied great thinkers from Plato to Marx. But the core of the 
course was in political and constitutional history - the writings of Maitland and Stubbs and their 
epigones, and much of our first year course was taken up. with learning how to explicate 
"gobbets," short passages from such politically important original documents as "The Act in 
Restraint of Appeals" (1533). 
Of course the privilege of doing so made us into an elite. In 1965 only a tiny group of young peo-
ple went to university (the figure we always quoted was 2%), and an even smaller percentage of 
women. Conversely, in 1964,75% of sixteen-year-olds and 86% of seventeen-year-olds were not 
at school, but either unemployed or working. Yet, though we were very privileged in ways that 
made us distinctly uncomfortable - did we really need a servant to make our bed. for us? -
it didn't seem as if we belonged to a social elite. Only I, the son of a surgeon, and David Tucker, 
whose father had a chain of butcher shops in south London, were not receiving a government 
grant, and most of my contemporaries were not metropolitan (many more from Manchester and, 
like myself, from Liverpool), were first-generation at university, and came from white-collar and 
skilled blue-collar backgrounds. Some, like the prodigious Roy Porter, could boast an authentic 
working-class pedigree. We may have begun the education of nineteenth-century gentlemen, but 
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I don't think that any of us saw ourselves as part of a future ruling class, intent on propagating 
British values to those whom we would later teach and govern. (Which isn't to say that this 
wasn't what happened to some of us.) Most of us fitted the stereotype of the upwardly mobile 
beneficiaries of the broadening of school education which was ascribed to the Butler Education 
Act of 1951. We saw ourselves as the rightful beneficiaries of a growing meritocracy, in a 
bastion of privilege but there in order to change it. 
Cultural Politics 
In my college nearly everyone (except for the evangelical Christians, a tiny, independent group) 
belonged to one of two broad, opposing coalitions: the labour club and the boat club. The labour 
club was not a branch of the Labour Party but a loose gathering of socialists, social democrats, 
Marxists, members of CND (The Committee on Nuclear Disarmament), and the anti-apartheid 
movement. (I'm not sure if he was actually a member of the group but its most admired figure 
was Ben Brewster, the translator of Althusser, who stalked the college wearing drab workers 
clothing rumoured to have been imported from Maoist China.) Similarly the boat club was not so 
much made up of people who rowed competitively on the river Cam - 1 knew at least one labour 
club member who did so - but was a group whose politics were conservative, and who treated 
university as a traditional finishing school for gentlemen, spending their time in private dining 
clubs, hunting with beagles, and enjoying sports (but never soccer). One of their number, a keen 
aficionado of the hounds, was John Patten, later to be Margaret Thatcher's education minister. 
These two bodies were divided not only by a fundamental ideological rift - between a traditional 
Right and modernizing Left - but also by very different conceptions of society, education and self. 
They spoke, or aspired to speak, Queen's English, we cultivated our regional accents; they wore 
tweed, we wore corduroy; we prided ourselves on our competence and intelligence, they culti-
vated insouciance; we believed in equality, they worshipped privilege; we enthusiastically 
embraced pop culture, they (even if they liked it a bit) saw it as "low." Politics and style were 
intertwined. Not coincidentally George Melly's history of the period is entitled Revolt into Styled2 
The cultural politics of the Left in Britain before 1968 were dominated by a number of loosely 
defined but inter-connected ideas. Though the idea that youth as a social category was not new 
to the period, the notion of "a generation" was a '60s innovation. Pete Townshend captured it 
brilliantly in The Who's "My Generation" (1965). This was less a cry for solidarity among a cohort 
(though it was certainly that) than a cult of youth that emphasized the hostility of the young for 
their elders: 
why don't you all fade away 
don't try to dig what we all say... 
things they do look awful cold 
hope I die before I get old.13 
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There was a sense that only those who lived in the (unique) present generation were capable of 
understanding its dilemmas and desires. My generation, a group that was defined by attitude as 
well as age, was the site of modernity. 
One of my generation's desires was for classlessness. The nuances of class were everywhere -
in language, education, dress - as well as wealth and power, but there was a naive, optimistic 
(and therefore Utopian) belief that youth - my generation - could efface these distinctions. For 
students like us Cambridge exposed the contradictions in this position. We - or perhaps more 
accurately I (one of the hardest parts of writing this essay is resisting the desire to create a "we" 
out of an "I") - responded by adopting the newly universal styles and manners of pop culture. 
This was not slumming on our part, a traditional pastime of the English élite, though I can't deny 
that I felt envious of my contemporaries who could claim, like Roy Porter, to be working-class 
heroes. But I saw the styles of pop culture as an attempt to create a new sort of social world. 
Pop culture - especially the music industry - was, of course, a quintessential product of affluent 
capitalism, but it was more than that. Capitalist or not, it was an important innovation that pre-
supposed a different subject and a different aesthetic. It was not mass culture, not working-class 
culture, not high culture. The key to pop culture was its aggressive erosion of conventional cul-
tural boundaries; it included material and values from high, mass, and sub-cultures, and from all 
varieties of modernism, which were conveyed through the media of art, music, television, radio 
and an alternative press. The object was to create a style - one that embraced not only the usual 
products of creative and artistic endeavour, but life itself. The '60s invented the (what was to 
become debased) notion of lifestyle. 
The key figures of British pop culture did not come, of course, from Cambridge University, but 
from the art schools, institutions in which painters like Richard Hamilton had invented pop art in 
the late '50s and which were populated by highly intelligent, rebellious members of the working 
class, like John Lennon and David Hockney. In my last years at school I used to hang out in the 
pubs and at the Everyman Theatre close to the Liverpool Art School on Mount Pleasant. (Lest we 
forget, Alan Ginsburg described Liverpool on his visit there in 1967 as "the centre of the con-
sciousness of the human universe."14) 
A figure I regarded with some awe from afar was Adrian Henri, a vast, bearded poet and painter 
who taught John Lennon, edited a mimeographed poetry magazine called Underdog, staged hap-
penings and mixed media events in the streets, at the art school and the Everyman, and was often 
to be seen in the pub The Crack with his arm lubriciously around one of the nubile school girls 
whose charms he celebrated in verse and private conversation. (Henri's website - sadly he died 
very recently - included the term "babeland.") Henri's 1965 poem (rather like Peter Blake's cover 
for the Beatles' Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band) captures many of the varied ele-
ments that made up pop culture: 
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Paul McCartney Gustav Mahler 
Alfred Jarry John Coltrane 
Charlie Mingus Claude Debussy 
Wordsworth Monet Bach and Blake 
Charlie Parker Pierre Bonnard 
Leonardo Bessie Smith 
Fidel Castro Jackson Pollock 
Ghandi Milton Munch and Berg 
Bela Bartok Henri Rousseau 
Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns 
Lukas Cranach Shostakovitch 
Kropotkin Ringo George and John 
William Burroughs Francis Bacon 
Dylan Thomas Luther King 
H.P. Lovecraft T.S. Eliot 
D.H. Lawrence Roland Kirk 
Salvatore Giuliano 
Andy Warhol Paul Cezanne 
Kafka Camus Ensor Rothko 
Jacques Prevert and Manfred Mann 
Marx Dostoevsky 
Bakunin Ray Bradbury 
Miles Davis Trotsky 
Stravinksy and Poe 
Danilo Dolci Napoleon Solo 
St John of the Cross and 
The Marquis de Sade 
Henri's poem speaks to the astonishing heterogeneity of pop culture and the rich variety of 
resources on which it drew (somewhat indiscriminately) for inspiration: the Romanticism of 
Wordsworth and Blake; the absurdist and existentialist tradition of Jarry, Camus and Kafka (as 
mediated in English by the likes of Norman Mailer and Colin Wilson); the anarchism, socialism 
and pacifism of Marx, Trotsky, Bakunin, Ghandi and Castro; a congeries of twentieth century art 
movements, above all Dada and surrealism, whose most notable characteristic was their critique 
of and capacity to outrage bourgeois society; the Beats, above all, Allan Ginsburg and William 
Burroughs; the modern jazz of Coltrane, Parker, and Monk; and the new scions of pop - Warhol, 
the Beatles, Napoleon Solo, Jagger and Manfred Mann. Essentially his poem is a catalogue of 
those who challenged bourgeois ethics, taste and politics, members of a group my father always 
Charles Rennie Mackintosh 
Rimbaud Claes Oldenberg 
Adrian Mitchell and Marcel Duchamp 
James Joyce and Hemingway 
Hitchcock and Bunuel 
Donald McKinlay Theolonius Monk 
Alfred Lord Tennyson 
Matthias Grunewald 
Philip Jones Griffiths and Roger McGough 
Guillaume Apollinaire 
Cannonball Adderley 
Rene Magritte 
Hieronymous Bosch 
Stephane Mallarme and Alfred de Vigny 
Ernst Mayakovsky and Nicholas De Stael 
Hindermith Mick Jagger and Schwitters 
Garcia Lorca 
and 
last of all 
me.15 
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called "the antis." (There are also, of course, some interesting absences: his litany is over­
whelming male, including only one woman, Bessie Smith. It seems to me, to push the oedipal 
point further, that this period was very much about male rebellion against patriarchal authority.) 
What Henri celebrates is variety not difference; pop aesthetics were picturesque. In pop culture 
and in the existentialism and socialism that were its radical fringes the aims were universal and 
humanist - not about the sort of identity politics that were to emerge in 1968. In as much as they 
had a political goal it was never about carving out a place in institutionalized politics for different 
groups in society; it was about creating the conditions in which individuals of every sort could 
realize their humanity. This was what Charles Taylor has called an expressivist critique of socie­
ty, one that links the aims and aspirations of this period to the tradition of the Young Hegelians 
and the young Marx, whose early writings (translated into English in the early '60s by Tom 
Bottomore) were de rigueur for the Left in this period.16 Expressivism was about individual self-
fulfillment and liberation. As such it occluded problems of social, racial and sexual difference, 
even as it helped create the conditions that eventually made their analysis a possibility. 
My attraction to pop culture was not in the strict sense political. It offered pleasure, noise, colour, 
movement and light which seemed all the more brilliant when compared with the sepia-coloured 
Victorianism that suffused the drab, dull, torpid middle-class suburbs of a provincial city like 
Liverpool in the late 1950s and 1960s. It was certainly a pleasure to pursue pleasure and see it 
as a sort of virtue - to dress in a pink corduroy suit and Chelsea boots, épater la bourgeoisie, 
chase girls in the cause of sexual liberation, listen at poetry readings with shop-assistants and 
dockers in the cause of classlessness, and explain to your parents that your refusal to behave as 
they wished had a Sartrean justification, or was a rejection of old-fashioned Victorian values. That 
said, there was a politics of pop, a commitment to modernity, a new historical subject and 
egalitarianism that was radically at odds with British conservatism. 
Socialism, Revisionism, Technology and the Labour Party 
The politics of pop had affinities with what, for convenience's sake, I will call technocratic social-
ism, a product of the 1960s that most of its proponents have thought best to forget. This was a 
reformist agenda in as much as it hoped to achieve its ends through existing political parties and 
structures but presented itself (correctly in my view) as a radical reorganization of British culture. 
The key to technocratic socialism was its claim to technical competence, its putative ability to 
engineer a more egalitarian society by harnessing modern technology and economic manage-
ment. Its key text was Tony Crosland's The Future of Socialism, published in 1956.17 Crosland 
belonged to a revisionist group of academics and intellectuals within the Labour Party who 
wished to redefine its objectives. He argued for a reformulation of socialism in the context of the 
so-called affluent society. Britain in the 1950s, he explained, was no longer an unreconstructed 
capitalist society of the sort that had existed in the 1930s. It now had a mixed economy, affluent 
workers - some of whom had bourgeois values, some of whom were white- rather than 
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blue-collar- and an industrial structure in which ownership and control were separated with the 
rise of a managerial class, whose object was to mediate rather than exacerbate the conflict 
between labour and capital. Implicit in this analysis was the assumption that Labour had to come 
to terms with/win the votes of groups outside the traditional working class, to become a 
national rather than sectoral party. 
As his critics were quick to point out, Crosland advocated an accommodation with capitalism. In 
a mixed economy, he argued, Labour governments should rely on "the price mechanism... [as] 
a reasonably satisfactory method of distributing the great bulk of consumer goods and industri-
al capital-goods, given the total amount of resources available for consumption and industrial 
investment."18 The object was to manage rather than own the economy (a requirement that 
demanded special, technical skills) in order to use that growth to pay for burgeoning social 
expenditure. Labour's challenge to years of Conservative rule lay in its technical expertise and in 
its willingness to put these to work for an egalitarian agenda. 
Crosland's work challenged the economistic assumption that ownership of the means of 
production necessarily determines the type and form of civil society. He was less interested 
in fetishising the means to socialism - public ownership -than in defining a series of socialist 
goals or moral ends which might be achieved in a variety of ways and means. Crosland's goals 
were equality, the abolition of poverty, full employment, social welfare, and the establishment 
of community. 
In effect what Crosland wanted to achieve was the abolition of social privilege. And he saw the 
most effective means of achieving these goals as fiscal reform - the aggressive taxation of 
capital gains and inherited wealth - and education reform - the opening up of high quality and 
higher education to all ranks of society. 
Education was a key plank in the revisionists' platform, both because equal access to education 
would help achieve the goal of a classless society, but also because changes in education would 
help create citizens better equipped to change the world. New scientific technologies and the 
insights of a rigorous though radical social science with an egalitarian agenda would facilitate the 
transformation of society. Quality education open to all would make competence, merit and ability, 
rather than privilege and belonging to the old-boy network, the conditions and criteria for success. 
The revisionist program sided Labour with modernity. (In its rhetoric it was not unlike Tony Blair's 
New Labour, though it placed far greater weight on equality than its 1990s successor.) It was linked 
to a larger impulse which, as we have seen, was sometimes described as anti-Victorian, but more 
often as anti-establishment. The term "the establishment," though an older coinage, achieved gen-
eral usage in the 1960s, most notably in Anthony Sampson's enormously influential The Anatomy 
of Britain (first published in 1962 and then reissued in 1965), which exposed to public view and in 
meticulous detail the centrality of public school friendships, kinship and old-boy networks in shoring 
up the system of hereditary privilege that lay at the heart of antiquated, inegalitahan Britain.19 
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Crosland's revisionism also shifted emphasis away from old socialist concerns with production 
and ownership towards an emphasis on consumption and distribution: "Production for use and 
production for profit may be taken as broadly coinciding now that working class purchasing 
power is so high. What is profitable is what the consumer finds useful, and the firm and the con-
sumer desire broadly the same allocation of resources. And while paternalists may dislike this 
allocation, wishing that less were spent on drink and pools and television sets, they must swal-
low their dislike in the interest of personal freedom."20 
This emphasis on freedom was characteristic of revisionism. The Labour Party's creation of the 
welfare state, it was claimed, had achieved Beveridge's aim of freedom from want; now people 
should not just be free from but free to enjoy their desires. This ran against Labour traditions that 
were puritanical or hypocritical about sex, and censorious about working-class pleasures that 
were consumerist or not "improving." (Think, for instance, of Richard Hoggart's threnody on the 
ills of working-class "flash" in his The Uses of Literacy.) Revisionism shared with pop culture 
both a critique of the traditional élite and an attachment to a loose kind of hedonism. 
Revisionism was a discourse of modernization, but not one that saw modernization in terms of 
the growth of the market. Rather it saw modernization as the triumph of enlightened rational 
communication to the end of creating a better, egalitarian civil society. Its aim was to remove the 
barriers - educational, cultural and social as well as economic - to human realization or self-ful-
fillment. It was, in many ways, more Habermasian than Marxist or market-oriented. 
The appeal of revisionism - certainly to me and I think to many others - lay in its emphasis on 
modernity, its ideological flexibility and its liberal refusal to overlook human desire. Of course 
many revisionists were conservative in their views of foreign policy - few were unilateralists or 
supporters of the "third way" - and to many they represented a politics of meliorism and wel-
farism - prolonging the life of capitalism by making it more palatable. But in their emphasis on 
reformism and a society of merit, they addressed a widely-perceived problem, just as in their shift 
from production to consumption they captured an important change in Britain away from post-
World War II austerity. 
By the early 1960s, and not least because of revisionist influence, the Labour Party had been 
largely revamped as the party of modernity and science. A series of position papers - Labour in 
the '60s, Signposts of the '60s, Labour in the Scientific Revolution - outlined a new vision of 
Britain, culminating in the party manifesto for the general election of 1964, The New Britain. 
These eloquently castigated Tory amateurism and incompetence: "With certain honourable 
exceptions, our finance and industry need a major shake up at the top. Too many directors owe 
their position to family, school or political connections. If the dead wood were cut out of Britain's 
boardrooms and replaced by the keen young executives, production engineers and scientists 
who are at present denied their legitimate prospects of promotion, our production and export 
problem would be much more manageable." They also linked Labour with a Utopian vision of 
technology and prosperity: "This is our message for the Sixties - a Socialist inspired scientific 
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and technological revolution releasing energy on an enormous scale." The talk of modernity and 
technology suffused the rhetoric of what Harold Wilson, Labour's leader, egregiously called "the 
white heat of the technological miracle." The language is best conveyed in this pastiche of '60s 
Labour speeches: 
Change... resurgence, a chance to sweep away the grouse-moor conception of 
Tory leadership and refit Britain with a new image... We are living in the jet age but 
we are governed by an Edwardian establishment mentality... clammy 
unimaginativeness at the top... clumsy, amateurish, ineffective and out-of-date, 
conservative, nostalgic, backward looking... need mobilization, a breakthrough to 
an exciting new period... streamlining, hard facts, storm the frontiers of 
knowledge... Britain's brashness and saltiness and political irreverence, energy 
and determination, in the age of automation, of jet and space travel.21 
This vision was not just held by the revisionists who on other issues, such as unilateral 
disarmament, tended to take a conservative position. It was also found on the Left. Frank Cousins 
and Tony Benn, neither of them revisionists, both held Labour cabinet posts in science and 
technology. Indeed the critique of the old order held the Labour party together and helped them 
win the election of 1964, albeit with a tiny parliamentary majority. 
This is not the place to rehearse the promises and failures of the Labour Party's vision - the rise 
and fall of the Department of Economic Affairs intended to manage the macro-economy, the 
radical increase in educational expenditure, the beginnings of a comprehensive system of edu-
cation, and the fiscal restructuring in the manner suggested by Crosland. The chief feature of the 
first of Harold Wilson's administrations was no such reformist achievement but its state of 
perpetual crisis, largely the result of a balance of payment deficit and a run on sterling which the 
Left attributed to the hostility of the City to a Labour government. 
The crisis kept the party together until the spring of 1966, when Wilson called an election and 
finally won a decisive majority. So that "New Ways in History" appeared at a time of great 
political ferment, in fact, one week after a general election in which the Labour Government 
finally had a proper political mandate. 
New Ways in History 
The Times Literary Supplement of 7 April 1966 was a special issue devoted to "New Ways in 
History." It consisted of twelve essays and an editorial designed to assess the state of history in 
Britain. Its cover, which I hope was ironic, included images of five British royals (William the 
Conqueror, the Black Prince, Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, Charles II), two British heroes (Nelson and 
Winston Churchill) and one foreign villain (Kaiser Wilhelm). Contributors included such 
luminaries of the Left as E. P. Thompson, writing on history from below, Eric Hobsbawm on 
history publishing, and Moses Finley (an American refugee from McCarthyism) on classical 
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history. Other essays examined amateur history, art history, contemporary history, the histories 
of Latin America, Asia and Africa, and of ideas and technology. Omissions from today's per-
spective are striking: there was no women's history; neither cultural history nor science studies 
had a place in this critical survey; nor, more surprisingly did the history of the United States, an 
omission that reflected the parlous state of U.S. history in Britain in the 1960s. Broadly speaking 
the issue had two large themes. The first was epitomized in Moses Finley's remark that "socio-
logical analysis not only complements and enhances more traditional approaches, it introduces 
radical correction"; the second in the repeated call for historical "relevance," for a history that 
addressed questions "which ordinary people wanted answering."22 
The issue began with an essay by the young Oxford historian, Keith Thomas, brusquely entitled, 
"The Tools and the Job."23 Thomas's contribution, which framed the entire issue, was a pas-
sionate plea and bold prognostication - the historians' manifesto - for a new kind of history. 
Thomas painted a picture of a profession in crisis. (The language of crisis was even more 
fashionable in the 1960s than it is today.) Specialization and recondite scholarship had so 
fragmented the discipline that "forali its scholarly rigour, [it] had succeeded in explaining remark-
ably little about the workings of human society and the fluctuations of human affairs." "History 
was seen as a craft... It invoked no recondite conceptual tools, for commonsense and good 
judgment were all that was needed to understand the workings of human beings."24 Amateur, 
empiricist, focused on a political élite, history lacked vision and rigour. The desire for overarch-
ing explanation and broader understanding had driven one generation of historians (note the 
language of generations) - Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton and Eric Hobsbawm - towards 
Marxism; it was now driving another towards the sciences of society - sociology, anthropology, 
demography and social psychology. Thomas framed his story as an account of a national failure 
to keep pace with the French, whose Annales School had linked history to the other social 
sciences, and with the Americans, who had a tradition of historical sociology. Historians in Britain 
- "they are decades behind their colleagues in other countries"25 - needed to refine their 
concepts in the light of social theory, to study statistics and the techniques of historical 
demography, and to learn from social anthropology how to investigate such irrational practices 
as witchcraft and crowd behaviour, and such small groups as villagers and peasant 
communities. Social, not political, history was to become the epicentre of historical studies. 
If historians were to keep up to date, a period of re-training was overdue. 
Thomas's manifesto certainly looked revolutionary, realigning the historians' object of study - the 
peasant as much as the prince, society as a whole "not just its political elite," the rest of the world 
and not just the West - and transforming its method from a commonsensical procedure to an 
accurate science. Above all it heralded a marked shift in the attitude of historians to the social 
sciences. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries those who had manned the good 
ship history had fought to repel sociologists and the like as unwanted intruders. Suddenly the old 
enemy was to be welcomed on board. Though today it seems tame (and, perhaps, misguided), 
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Thomas's call was enormously controversial at the time. I remember one of my teachers 
disparaging Thomas as someone always telling us how to write history but not doing it himself 
- this was before the publication of his Religion and the Decline of Magic. And Thomas himself, 
though he now professes that he did not intend to stir controversy, and is at pains to deny that 
the issue as a whole was ever coordinated as a manifesto for historical change, ruefully admits 
that the issue and his contribution in particular caused quite a stir.26 
The poetics of Thomas's essay are interesting: they are democratic and technocratic, 
scientific and progressive. The title lays down the gauntlet - The Tools and the Job. Gentlemen 
and amateurs do not use tools; they are not engaged in anything that approaches technical or 
manual labour. And the language of science pervades the essay: "Refined statistical 
techniques... precision... rigorous... demanding techniques of verification... objective... mathe-
matically sophisticated tools of measurement... elaborate theoretical models... voluminous 
statistics... microscopic analysis... the age of the historical factory... technical training... new 
intellectual enterprises."27 
Thomas's message, using the language of technology and enlightened social management, 
linked the new history to the larger processes of modernization. It presented history as a pro-
gressive not traditional discipline. This was politically shrewd as well as intellectually bold. For, 
in an era of university expansion in which the social sciences were seen as leading sectors in the 
new learning, history could claim its place in the intellectual vanguard. But it is noticeable that 
Thomas never explicitly acknowledges the politics of his position because he wants to move 
beyond a history moved by political engagement (exemplified by the Marxist historians of the pre-
vious generation) into the realm of objective, historical science. 
The target of Thomas's critique was clear: the circumscribed, narrowly defined political history 
that comprised the core of the university curriculum that I was currently studying and which, as 
we have seen, dated back to the nineteenth century. The challenge, then, was to a key feature of 
the British establishment and to its ideological assumptions. And, of course, it struck a chord with 
the students who were, or saw themselves, as outside the old élite, who saw themselves as the 
beneficiaries of an ideology of merit. Indeed, one of the uniting themes of the contributions to 
"New Ways in History" was their repeated and implacable hostility to political history and to its 
narrative technique of telling the lives of the great. (It was this conflation between political 
history and narrative history that helps explain why for so long the latter had a bad name.) 
But what was to replace political history? Thomas's criticism of "disintegrated history" and call 
for an understanding of "the workings of human society" implies a totalising history of the human 
species. This, according to Thomas, was not Marxism, which he gave high marks for boldness 
of vision, but low marks for its ability "to convey the complex realities of historical development." 
Possibly Thomas was thinking of the Annales School's claim to write total history. But there was 
more in his essay about the tools and much less about the job. 
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Thomas's poetics of a scientific history posited a new sort of historian - both as student and 
professional. On the one hand it harked back to the old idea of history as an apposite training for 
the professional and governing classes, replacing woolly constitutionalism and common sense 
with technocratic egalitarianism, politics with society. On the other, it posited a new kind of 
technically trained, super-competent historian whose researches would contribute to a new 
general vision of the history of the social order. This new historian was something of a faceless 
creature - a man in a white coat (even if he was wearing a pink corduroy suit underneath it) -
someone with no features apart from his technical competence; he was once again a classless 
creature, the bearer and representative of a universal objectivity. It is no surprise that Thomas's 
vision was totalising; and it was no coincidence that he alluded explicitly to the conjectural social 
histories of the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Though all the contributors to the special issue of the TLS were united by a shared hostility to 
traditional political history as elitist, narrow and irrelevant to modern society - the history of an 
outdated Establishment - there was less unanimity over the value of scientific history. (Though 
it is a sign of those times that even Edward Thompson, of all people, gestured towards the value 
of social science history.) Uneasiness about technocratic history took the form of fears that a 
more technical history would not be "intelligible and attractive to the layman," answering "the 
questions about history which ordinary people wanted answering," addressing issues that were 
"central and serious and relevant."28 There was a persistent tension between the pressures to 
make history more technical and the desire to see it as democratically accessible to a broad-
based citizenry. 
The critics of old political history all agreed that the object of historical study should change. Over 
the next twenty years they were to realize this goal. (In my years as a young teacher in Cambridge 
in the 1970s, curricular reform - together with the opening of the university to more women -
were high on the agenda.) It became possible to explore the many realms of social experience, 
to write about the marginal and dispossessed, women and children, the criminal and insane, the 
irrational and obscure, the private and the intimate, and to have such studies treated seriously. 
But this sort of history was not so much legitimated by an appeal to science, as couched in terms 
of a democratic relevance to ordinary people. It depended not on cool detachment and distance, 
but on engagement and intimacy. It sought historical truth, but rejected the view that science was 
the means by which it could be achieved. It encouraged emotional sympathy and identification 
with groups in the past in order to understand (and perhaps change) their position in contempo-
rary society. This sort of historical writing was not new - indeed, in Britain it had a proud pedi-
gree, celebrated in Edward Thompson's contribution to the TLS, in the Fabian, socialist, and 
Marxist writings on capitalism, poverty, labour and class struggle by the likes of Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, R. H. Tawney, G. D. H. Cole, Donna Torr, H. L. Morton - but it was now diversi-
fied to include race, gender and sexual orientation. There was nothing terribly objective about this 
scholarship - it was passionate and committed - and it depended for much of its effect on 
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dramatic historical narrative. It might be scientific in the socialist sense of embodying a theory of 
historical change, but, as its greatest practitioner of the 1960s and 1970s, E. P. Thompson, 
clearly demonstrated, it was resolutely literary and rhetorical in form, a bent that oddly enough 
was reinforced by post-structuralist versions of the French theory he affected to despise. 
Scientific, technocratic history did not prove popular in Britain, even amongst some of its 
strongest proponents.29 (Thomas himself is a clear case in point.) Engaged pluralism, in this 
sphere, as in so many others, triumphed over a universal vision whose claim to truth apparently 
derived from its general objectivity. Though this is far from the whole explanation, its failure can, 
I think, be linked to the failure of socialist technocratic politics in Britain in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s as well as to a growing skepticism about universal claims in both politics and aca-
demic inquiry. But for a while in the 1960s two very different historical visions (or, at least, so 
they appear in retrospect) were united against a traditionalist enemy in a modernizing project. 
I don't want my account to appear too nostalgic. The contradictions inherent in the totalising 
vision of scientific socialism, Thomas's version of a new history, and pop culture's poetics of 
personal liberation are pretty obvious, and the criticisms directed against them seem very per-
suasive to me. But these different initiatives embody a moment in which it seemed possible to 
make a real break with the past and its traditions and, in a rather Utopian (and naive) way, to 
transform politics, society and history. They promised both freedom and power. Perhaps this 
was an (oedipal) adolescent fantasy and the 1960s (as has often been said) an adolescent 
decade, one abruptly thrust into maturity (not manhood) in 1968. But, though the different 
projects I have discussed were all, within their own terms, failures, they all had important 
unintended consequences - more important, perhaps, in culture and history than in politics, but 
sufficiently sweeping that conservative academics and social commentators still blame the woes 
of the present day on the '60s. 
More particularly, despite the conflict it occasioned, I have no regrets about having chosen my 
uncle's vision of history rather than my father's. Certainly the first book I wrote, Party Ideology 
and Popular Politics,30 was a deliberate and frontal assault on the traditional political history of 
elites and the figure, Sir Lewis Namier, who embodied its anti-theoretical traditions and contempt 
for equality. Namier admired Britain for its pragmatic traditionalism. The English, he said, "per-
ceive and accept facts without anxiously enquiring into their reasons and meaning," a national 
virtue because "the less man clogs the free play of his mind with political doctrine and dogma, 
the better for his thinking." As for the populace, "there is no free will in the thinking of the 
masses, any more than in the revolutions of the planets, in the migrations of birds, and in the 
plunging of hordes of lemmings into the sea."31 Such views were anathema to me, and Party 
Ideology was devoted to the proposition that ideas and arguments in politics count and that even 
in the eighteenth century, long regarded as an era of delightful, oligarchic complacency, they 
were vigorously debated by many beyond the political elite. Similarly almost all the work I have 
pursued on the cultures of consumption is coloured by an abiding sense that commercialized, 
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popular and mass consumption - like the pop culture of the 1960s - is an important source of 
creativity that deserves serious historical analysis.32 And last, but not least, my foray into the 
history of eighteenth-century state formation, bureaucracy and the politics of information, though 
hardly a study of the "white heat of the technological miracle," was informed by a strong sense 
of the technical powers of governing and of information management. I don't want to exaggerate 
the continuities between my experiences in the 1960s and my writing thereafter. I'm leery of 
creating a tidy genealogy of anyone's intellectual development. But I can occasionally detect in 
my historical writing the impress of those events of 1966 that as Benjamin says - "underlie... 
[the historian's] presentation like a text written in invisible ink." 
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